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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Petitioner German Popoca-Garcia (hereinafter "Mr. Popoca") appeals 
from the district court's order denying his petition seeking post-conviction 
relief following an evidentiary hearing. This appeal presents the question 
of whether trial counsel's performance in advising Mr. Popoca during plea 
negotiations - specifically, the clarity of his explanation of the immigration 
consequences of entering a guilty plea - met an objective standard of 
reasonableness. Under the standards articulated in Padilla v. Kentucky, Mr. 
Popoca's trial counsel is required to give him clear, specific, affirmative and 
correct legal advice as to the presumptive immigration consequences of a 
guilty plea where those consequences are clear. Mr. Popoca, a non-citizen, 
pleaded guilty to the felony offense of Lewd Conduct with a Minor Child 
Under Sixteen, in violation of Idaho Code § 18-1508, which is clearly an 
" aggravated felony" under the Immigration and Nationality Act 
(hereinafter "INA"), and therefore made his deportation a virtual certainty. 
There is no dispute as to the clarity of the consequences-the dispute 
pertains instead to the clarity with which trial counsel actually conveyed 
those consequences to Mr. Popoca. 
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Because trial counsel did not clearly communicate the legal 
consequence to Mr. Popoca, he was unable to make an informed decision 
about knowingly and voluntarily entering a guilty plea. Further, trial 
counsel's performance was deficient because it would have been rational 
under the circumstances for Mr. Popoca to reject the plea bargait;l had he 
known that admitting guilt to Lewd Conduct with a Minor Child Under 
Sixteen would have virtually guaranteed his deportation. For these 
reasons, the district court erred when it denied Mr. Popoca's request for 
post-conviction relief. 
STATEMENT OFTHE FACTS AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
Mr. Popoca is a citizen of Mexico and held the status of Lawful 
Permanent Resident of the United States since he was ten years old. (R., p. 
4.) On June 18, 2010, Mr. Popoca was charged in the Sixth Judicial District 
Court in Bingham County with the offense of Lewd Conduct with a Minor 
Child Under Sixteen, pursuant to I.C. § 18-1508 (R., pp. 88-89). On the 
advice of his attorney, Manuel Murdoch, Mr. Popoca pleaded guilty to the 
charged offense on September 17, 2010. (R., p. 89.) 
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The Change of Plea Hearing 
At the change of plea hearing the court put Mr. Popoca under oath 
and asked him a series of questions about (among other things) the nature 
of the charged offense, the potential penalty that could result from a guilty 
plea, and his right as a defendant to seek a jury trial. (Tr., pp. 5-10.) 
During this colloquy, the court advised Mr. Popoca that, pursuant to the 
plea agreement, he would be required to undergo a psychosexual 
evaluation. (Tr., p. 9, Ls. 4-6.) The court then announced that Mr. Popoca 
understood the nature of the offense and the consequence of pleading 
guilty, and found that he entered the guilty plea knowingly and 
voluntarily. (Tr., p. 10, Ls. 22-25 - p.ll, Ls. 1-3.) 
After the court accepted his guilty plea, Mr. Murdoch informed the 
court that "My client will most likely have some immigration consequences 
to this [the guilty plea]. And I've informed him of this, that this could put 
his permanent resident status in jeopardy, a plea to this charge, and he's 
understood that." (Tr., p. II, Ls. 7-11.) (emphasis added). Under the INA, 
this state criminal conviction is an "aggravated felony" that mandates 
deportation. 8 U.s.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A). The Court then asked Mr. Popoca, 
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"Sir, you do understand that? That you could be deported because of this 
crime?" (Tr., p. 11, Ls. 12-13.) Mr. Popoca replied, "Yes." (Tr., p. 11, L. 14.) 
The Sentencing Hearing 
At the sentencing hearing on December 17,2010, Mr. Murdoch 
requested probation for Mr. Popoca. (Tr., pp. 16-20.) After Mr. Murdoch 
made his case for probation, deputy prosecutor Randy Smith stated, "My 
office has been contacted by ICEI [Immigration and Customs Enforcement]. 
Once this case is adjudicated - and they would ask that the judgment is 
clear as to the ages of the victim and Mr. Popoca-Garcia at the time - is that 
he will be placed into deportation proceedings." (Tr., p. 20, Ls. 21-25 - p. 21, 
L. 1.) (emphasis added). Mr. Murdoch responded," As far as the 
immigration issue goes, Mr. Smith said he is going to be deported. It's 
premature to say that. We don't know. That's going to have to run through 
whatever proceedings immigration courts do. I do a lot of immigration law. 
And I can say it's unclear at this point whether this would actually result in a 
removal or not." (Tr., p. 24, L. 25 - p. 25, Ls. 1-6.) (emphasis added). 
1 The U.s. Immigration and Customs Enforcement is the investigative arm of the 
Department of Homeland Security. See, http://www.ice.gov/about/overview/ (last 
visited 10/03/2013). 
4 
The district court sentenced Mr. Popoca to a period of incarceration 
of two years fixed, eight years indeterminate. (Tr., p. 28, Ls. 16-17.) On 
May 4,2011, the district court relinquished jurisdiction and ordered Mr. 
Popoca to serve his period of incarceration. (R., p. 89.) Mr. Popoca did not 
appeal his conviction or sentence. Id. 
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief 
On January 27, 2012, Mr. Popoca filed this Petition for Post-
Conviction Relief with the district court. (R., pp. 4-11.) In this Petition, Mr. 
Popoca averred that Mr. Murdoch did not tell him that his conviction for 
Lewd Conduct with a Minor Child Under Sixteen was an aggravated 
felony under the INA that made his deportation a virtual certainty. (R., pp. 
6-7.) Mr. Popoca also averred that Mr. Murdoch did not inform him that a 
conviction for an aggravated felony legally required the loss of his Lawful 
Permanent Resident status and his detention pending the resolution of 
deportation proceedings. (R., pp. 6-7.) Mr. Popoca further avers that but 
for the erroneous advice, he would have exercised his right to a jury trial 
and otherwise tried to mitigate the adverse immigration consequences of 
any conviction. (R., p. 8.) 
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Without an answer from the State, the district court issued a Notice of 
Intent to Dismiss the Petition for Post-Conviction Relief on March 5, 2012, 
reflecting the court's inclination to dismiss the case on the basis that the 
Petitioner was aware that his plea could cause his deportation. (R., pp. 13-
18.) Mr. Popoca filed a Response to the Notice of Intent to Dismiss on 
March 27,2012, arguing (among other things) that defense counsel was 
obligated to tell Mr. Popoca that if he pleaded guilty to the charged offense 
that his deportation was virtually certain. (R., pp. 19-28.) The State filed its 
Answer to the Petition on August 7,2012. (R., pp. 29-31.) The district court 
then set the matter for an evidentiary hearing on November 30, 2012 to 
resolve the question of whether or not Mr. Murdoch met his duty under 
Padilla by clearly informing Mr. Popoca that a guilty plea to the charged 
offense would result in deportation rather than that such a plea could result 
in deportation. (R., pp. 32-33; p. 91.) 
The Evidentiary Hearing 
Two witnesses testified at the evidentiary hearing: Mr. Murdoch and 
Mr. Popoca's step-father, Adolfo Arroyo. (Tr., pp. 33-61, 63-67.) The 
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district court decision did not make any specific factual findings.2 (R., pp. 
88-95.) The district court did not make any overt credibility 
determinations. Id. 
Testimony of Manuel Murdoch at the Evidentiary Hearing 
Mr. Murdoch testified that he had concluded that a guilty plea would 
result in an aggravated felony conviction and a loss of permanent resident 
status. (Tr., p. 36, Ls. 20-25; p. 53, Ls. 21-25 - p. 54, L. 1.) For his part, Mr. 
Murdoch swears that he informed Mr. Popoca of that consequence. (Tr., p. 
37, Ls. 4-6; p. 48, Ls. 16-20; p. 54, Ls. 6-10.) However, Mr. Murdoch also 
testified that he informed Mr. Popoca that deportation was only a 
possibility, telling him that ICE" could" and" most likely would" deport 
Mr. Popoca as a result of the conviction. (Compare Tr., p. 36, Ls. 20-25 with 
Tr., p. 37, Ls. 20-21.) Additionally, Mr. Murdoch testified that he informed 
2 As explained in the Standard of Review section of this brief, the Petitioner assumes as 
true those facts that are not directly refuted and may support the district court's 
ultimate conclusion that U[b]y the time of sentencing, Popoca-Garcia had already 
knowingly and voluntarily pled guilty with an understanding that he would be 
deported." Petitioner submits that the conclusion of the district could have been based 
upon any combination of factual findings. As argued, infra, the failure to make specific 
factual findings materially affects this Court's ability to adequately review the questions 
presented by this appeal as the acceptance or rejection of certain facts directly instruct 
whether Mr. Murdoch provided constitutionally effective counseL The Petitioner, 
however, did not object to the lack of factual findings below. 
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Mr. Popoca that ICE officials believed that they could not deport him based 
on such a conviction. (Tr., p. 37, Ls. 11-23; p. 48, Ls. 21-23; p. 54, Ls. 18-20.) 
Mr. Murdoch then testified that Mr. Popoca did appear to him to be 
intellectually slow, and that he took extra time to explain the sentencing 
arrangement to him. (Tr., p. 54, Ls. 23-25 - p. 55, Ls. 1-5, 10-14.) The 
psychosexual evaluation that occurred after the change of plea hearing 
affirmed Mr. Popoca's low intellectual functioning. (Tr., p,,;55, Ls. 6-9.) 
Nonetheless, Mr. Murdoch stated that he did not recall any response or 
reaction on the part of Mr. Popoca after explaining to him that the guilty 
plea would subject him to mandatory deportation. (Tr., p. 44, Ls. 2-16; p. 
50, Ls. 4-14.) 
While Mr. Murdoch doesn't doubt that he spoke to Mr. Popoca's 
parents at some point during the course of Mr. Popoca's case, he also 
testified that he did not recall informing them that he remained unsure 
about the immigration consequences of the conviction. (Tr., p. 55, Ls. 16-
23.) 
Finally, Mr. Murdoch testified that because ICE's position was that 
they could not deport Mr. Popoca based on such a conviction, he argued 
for probation at sentencing and again represented to the court that Mr. 
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Popoca's deportation was not automatic but a possibility. (Tr., p. 39, Ls. 21-
25 - p. 40, Ls. 1-10.) Mr. Murdoch subsequently acknowledged that while 
ICE field agents have the power to arrest and detain individuals, they do 
not appear in immigration court to bring the charge and argue for 
deportation. (Tr., p. 56, Ls. 24-25 - p. 57, Ls. 1-25 - p. 58, Ls. 1-22.) 
Testimony of Adolfo Arroyo at the Evidentiary Hearing 
The only other witness at the evidentiary hearing was Mr. Popoca's 
step-father, Adolfo Arroyo. The district decision states that Mr. Arroyo 
testified that he spoke with Mr. Murdoch after the sentencing hearing to 
ask how Mr. Popoca's criminal case would affect his immigration status. 
(R., p. 94.) Mr. Arroyo actually testified that he had conversations with Mr. 
Murdoch before one court hearing and after another. (Tr., p. 65, Ls. 9-15.) 
Mr. Arroyo testified that Mr. Murdoch did not fully answer his questions 
and that Mr. Murdoch's answer was "I don't know until immigration 
decides." (Tr., p. 65, 1. 24.) The court did not evaluate whether Mr. Arroyo 
was credible or the weight given to his testimony other than to say that Mr. 
Popoca was not present at the time. (R., p. 94.) 
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Issues briefed by the parties after the Evidentiary Hearing 
In the parties' written briefs for closing argument, both Mr. Popoca 
and the State agreed that the immigration consequences of the conviction 
were clear and that Mr. Murdoch had a duty to provide clear and correct 
advice. (R., pp. 53-54,65-66.) The State argued that Mr. Murdoch did 
inform Mr. Popoca that a conviction would result in deportation, and that 
Mr. Murdoch's advice was not qualified by advising his client of the 
allegedly erroneous opinion conveyed by ICE officials. (R., pp. 53-54.) Mr. 
Popoca argued that Mr. Murdoch's performance was deficient for failure to 
clearly and accurately inform him of the obvious immigration 
consequences of pleading guilty because: (1) Mr. Murdoch's advice was, at 
best, contradictory, and at worst, completely wrong; (2) Mr. Murdoch 
relied, in part, on hearsay statements about the apparent deportation 
intentions of ICE even though he admitted that ICE was not the 
prosecuting agency in deportation actions; and (3) Mr. Murdoch's 
contradictory statements and implicit suggestion that Mr. Popoca might 
not be deported rendered any correct advice once given, deficient, denying 
Mr. Popoca a fully understanding of the range of consequences of his 
guilty plea. (R., pp. 77-81.) 
1U 
The District Court decision 
On January 17, 2013, the district court issued a written decision 
denying Mr. Popoca's request for post-conviction relief. (R., pp. 88-95.) 
First, the court found that the immigration consequences of the conviction 
were truly clear, and that Mr. Murdoch had a duty to give correct advice. 
(R., p. 92.) The court noted that correct advice required more than just 
informing Mr. Popoca that he might be deported; it required informing 
him that he would be deported. (R., p. 92.) To this end, the court 
determined that the plea colloquy, standing alone, did not suffice to show 
that Mr. Popoca understood that deportation was virtually certain to occur 
as a result of his plea, which in turn prompted the evidentiary hearing. (R., 
p.93.) 
After evaluating the testimony that emerged from the evidentiary 
hearing, the court found that Mr. Popoca failed to marshal sufficient 
evidence, pursuant to the first prong of Strickland v. Washington, to show 
that Mr. Murdoch failed to fulfill defense counsel's obligation under 
Padilla. (R., p. 95.) The court concluded that Mr. Murdoch did, in fact, 
make a direct representation to Mr. Popoca that the charged offense would 
have adverse immigration consequences, and that this representation met 
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an objective standard of reasonableness. (R., p. 95.) While the court's 
decision did not include specific factual findings, the Petitioner did not 
object to the lack of factual findings, and subsequently filed this appeal. 
(R., pp. 88-95, 99-101.) 
Because deportation proceedings do not stop during either the 
criminal appeals process or the post-conviction relief process, an 
immigration judge ordered Mr. Popoca's deportation on December 3, 
2012.3 The Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed his appeal of that 
order on April 11, 2013.4 Mr. Popoca has since been deported to Mexico. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Whether Mr. Murdoch's statements to Mr. Popoca about the 
immigration consequences of his guilty to plea were legally sufficient 
to meet the standard of Padilla v.Kentucky. 
2. Assuming, arguendo, that Mr. Murdoch provided legally sufficient 
advice to Mr. Popoca under Padilla v. Kentucky, whether that advice 
was nullified by Mr. Murdoch's suggestion to Mr. Popoca might not 
be deported in fact. 
3 This Board decision and Mr. Popoca's subsequent physical removal occurred after the 
proceedings below concluded a motion to augment the record will be filed. 
4 Id. 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Mr. Popoca seeks post-conviction relief to withdraw a guilty plea that 
he alleges was unknowing and involuntary because his prior defense 
attorney, Mr. Murdoch, failed to correctly advise him about the 
immigration consequences of his plea. (R., pp. 4-10.) 1/ A claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel may properly be brought under the post-
conviction procedure act." Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269, 272 (Ct. App. 
2002). In this civil proceeding, Mr. Popoca bears the burden of establishing 
that he is entitled to post-conviction relief by a preponderance of the 
evidence. See, e.g., Howard v. State, 126 Idaho 231, 233 (Ct. App. 1994). 
In a post-conviction petition based on a claim that trial counsel failed 
to advise or misadvised the Petitioner about the immigration consequences 
of a criminal conviction, Strickland applies. Padilla v. Kentucky, _ U.S. _ , 
130 S.Ct. 1473, 1482 (2010). A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 
presents a mixed question of law and fact. Booth v. State, 151 Idaho 612, 617 
(2011). When faced with mixed questions of law and fact, an appellate 
court will defer to the factual findings made by lower courts if those 
determinations are based upon substantial evidence, but freely reviews the 
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application of the relevant law to those facts. Murray v. State, 121 Idaho 
918,921-22 (Ct. App. 1992). 
Upon review of a district court's denial of a petition for post-
conviction relief when an evidentiary hearing has occurred, Idaho 
appellate courts will not disturb the district court's factual findings unless 
they are clearly erroneous. LR.C.P. 52(a); Booth, 151 Idaho at 617; McKinney 
v. State, 133 Idaho 695, 700 (1999); Martinez v. State, 125 Idaho 844 (Ct. App. 
1994). A finding of fact will not be deemed clearly erroneous if it is 
supported by substantial, even if conflicting, evidence in the 
record. Holmes v. State, 104 Idaho 312 (1983). However, if there are no 
specific findings of fact, an appellate court should only disregard the 
absence of findings of fact if the record is clear and presents an obvious 
answer to the question on appeal. Pope v. Intermountain Gas Co., 103 Idaho 
217,225 (1982). While the credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be 
given to their testimony, and the inferences to be drawn from the evidence 
are all matters solely within the province of a district court, Bradley v. State, 
151 Idaho 629, 631 (Ct. App. 2011), the legal conclusions of a district court 
drawn from its factual findings are freely reviewed by an appellate court. 
Young v. State, 115 Idaho 52 (Ct. App. 1988). 
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As a mixed question of law and fact, this Court must assess whether 
the facts of Mr. Murdoch's representation meet the legal standard of 
constitutionally effective counsel under Padilla and Strickland. The district 
court decision did not include specific factual findings. See I.C. § 19-4907(a) 
(requiring court to make specific factual findings on each issue after an 
evidentiary hearing). Nonetheless, the decision concludes that "[b]y the 
time of sentencing, Mr. Popoca-Garcia had already knowingly and 
voluntarily pled guilty with an understanding that he would be deported." 
(R., pp. 94-95;) The decision recites a variety of facts, some of which are 
essential to the court's legal conclusion, and others that are not essential 
but may have been found by the court. The Petitioner submits that the 
essential facts include the fact that Mr. Murdoch knew that Mr. Popoca was 
a Lawful Permanent Resident, and that he told Mr. Popoca that deportation 
would be a consequence of a guilty plea. See R., pp. 94-95. However, the 
decision also includes facts of Mr. Murdoch's representations to the court 
at the change of plea and sentencing hearings and his communications 
with Mr. Popoca about whether immigration authorities would actually 
deport him. See generally, R. pp. 88-95. 
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The district court decision also did not address the credibility of the 
two testifying witnesses. To reach its conclusion, the district court must 
have found Mr. Murdoch a credible witness, and for this reason, 
Petitioner's argument begins from an assumption that the district court 
found Mr. Murdoch credible. 
In the context of alleged deficiencies of counsel relating to guilty 
pleas, the specific standard for prejudice is whether "there is a reasonably 
probability that, but for counsel's errors, [the defendant] would not have 
pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." Ridgley v. State, 
148 Idaho 671,676 (2009). "[T]he focus is 'on the defendant's state of mind 
when choosing to plead guilty,' and there is no requirement that the Court 
speculate as to the potential sentence for a lesser charged offense should 
the jury convict on that basis at retrial." Booth, 151 Idaho at 622 (quoting 
McKeeth v. State, 140 Idaho 847, 853 (2004)). 
LEGAL ARGUMENT 
1. Introduction. 
On December 3,2012, Mr. Popoca was stripped of his status as a 
Lawful Permanent Resident of the United States and ordered deported for 
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having entered a guilty plea on advice of his trial counsel, Mr. Murdoch5, 
to an offense that qualifies as an 1/ aggravated felony" under the INA. The 
result should have surprised nobody. It should not have surprised Mr. 
Murdoch, who testified that he 1/ did a lot of immigration law," and it 
should not have surprised Mr. Popoca because as a non-citizen defendant 
in criminal proceedings, he is guaranteed effective counsel, which includes 
the unequivocal advice that he would be deported if he plead guilty to Lewd 
Conduct with a Minor Under Sixteen, I.e. § 18-1508. (Tr., p. 34, Ls. 16-19; 
p. 36, Ls. 14-15.) Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1478, 1483. 
There is no dispute that Mr. Popoca was a Lawful Permanent 
Resident of the United States and that the entry of his guilty plea to Lewd 
Conduct with a Minor under Sixteen would subject him to automatic 
deportation. (R., pp. 53, 65-66, 92.) There is no dispute that this 
consequence to Mr. Popoca was patently clear, entitling him to clear, 
correct advice that as a consequence of his plea, his deportation was 
presumptively automatic. (R., pp. 53, 65-66, 92.) There is also no dispute 
that trial counsel talked to Mr. Popoca about the immigration consequences 
5 This final order and Mr. Popoca's subsequent physical removal occurred after the 
proceedings below concluded a motion to augment the record will be filed. 
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of his guilty plea on more than one occasion, including before the entry of 
his guilty plea. (R., pp. 53-55, 75-81,92-94.) The district court and both 
parties agreed that Mr. Murdoch was required to inform Mr. Popoca that 
deportation was a virtual certainty, automatic or otherwise unavoidable. 
(R., p. 92.) ("In this case, as in Padilla, the immigration consequences are 
truly clear and defense counsel had a duty to give correct advice. That 
advice had to be more than Mr. Popoca-Garcia might be deported. It had to 
be that he would be deported.") (emphasis added). See also R., pp. 53-54 
(State's brief noting that the correct advice is that Mr. Popoca would be 
deported if found guilty) (emphasis added). The focus of this petition is 
the accuracy and clarity of trial counsel's advice. 
Trial counsel told Mr. Popoca, variously, that he would be deported, that 
he might be deported, that he was likely to be deported, and suggested that he 
might not be deported at all by the immigration authorities who erroneously 
believed that the charged offense did not require that he be deported. (Tr., 
p. 37, Ls. 4-23; p. 48, Ls. 16-23.) Even if this Court were to find that trial 
counsel clearly provided Mr. Popoca the correct advice at some time, the 
advice was nullified by trial counsel's suggestion that Mr. Popoca might 
escape deportation because of an error on behalf of the immigration 
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authorities. (Tr., p. 37, Ls. 4-23; p. 48, Ls. 16-23.) Twice, trial counsel 
represented to the district court that deportation was only a possibility, and 
that he told his client as much. (Tr., p. 11, Ls. 6-11 (change of plea); p. 24, 
Ls. 25 - p. 25, Ls. 1-6. (sentencing)) One representation was made to the 
court before Mr. Popoca entered his plea, the other before the court 
pronounced the sentence. Id. 
Because trial counsel failed to satisfy his duty to clearly and 
unequivocally inform Mr. Popoca that federal law required his 
deportation, Mr. Popoca demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence 
that trial counsel was ineffective. For these reasons, the district court erred 
when it dismissed Mr. Popoca's petition for post-conviction relief. 
II. Mr. Murdoch failed to unequivocally communicate to Mr. 
Popoca that he would be deported. 
Mr. Popoca's allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel within a 
post-conviction petition is measured by the standards articulated by the 
u.s. Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.s. 668 (1984). See, 
e.g., State v. Yokovac, 145 Idaho 437, 444 (2007). In March of 2010, the u.s. 
Supreme Court ruled that constitutionally effective counsel requires 
defense counsel to affirmatively inform a non-citizen defendant of the 
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immigration consequences of a plea agreement. Padilla, 130 S.Ct. at 1478, 
1483. See also United States v. Bonilla, 637 F.3d 980, 984 (9th Cir. 2011) (itA 
criminal defendant who faces almost certain deportation is entitled to 
know more than that it is possible that a guilty plea could lead to removal; 
he is entitled to know that it is a virtual certainty. It) The duty requires 
defense counsel to give clear, accurate advice where the deportation 
consequence is clear. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S.Ct. at 1482-3. The standard 
set forth in Strickland applies to ineffective assistance of counsel claims 
based on an allegation of deficient advice under Padilla. Id. at 1482. The 
standard involves a two-part inquiry: first, whether the defendant has 
demonstrated that his counsel tendered deficient performance that fell 
below an objective standard of reasonableness; and second, whether there 
is a reasonable possibility that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the 
proceedings would have been different. Yokovac, 145 Idaho at 444. 
The INA defines various offenses as an " aggravated felony" and 
mandates that a Lawful Permanent Resident who is convicted of an 
"aggravated felony" be deported. 8 U.s.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). In addition, 
a Lawful Permanent Resident convicted of an aggravated felony is 
rendered ineligible for any discretionary relief from removal, and is subject 
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to mandatory detention by immigration authorities. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(3); 8 
U.s.C. § 1226(c). The offense of "sexual abuse of a minor" appears third on 
the list of offenses that are aggravated felonies. 8 U.s.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A). 
The Idaho offense of Lewd Conduct with a Minor Under Sixteen is clearly 
an aggravated felony. 
Recognizing that immigration law is a complex body of law, the U.s. 
Supreme Court explained that the level of clarity with which a defense 
attorney must advise the non-citizen defendant is directly related to the 
clarity of the immigration consequences. Padilla, 130 S.Ct. at 1473. Like Mr. 
Popoca, Mr. Padilla was a Lawful Permanent Resident. Padilla 130 S.Ct. at 
1477. (R., p., 4.) Like Mr. Popoca, Mr. Padilla pleaded guilty to an offense 
that explicitly defined the removal consequence of the plea. Padilla, 130 
S.Ct. at 1483. (R., p., 5.) The U.s. Supreme Court agreed with Mr. Padilla 
that constitutionally competent counsel would have told him that his 
conviction subjected him to automatic deportation. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 
S.Ct. at 1478. Because the law is clear that Mr. Popoca was charged with a 
"sexual abuse of a minor" offense and the deportation consequence is clear, 
Mr. Murdoch had an affirmative obligation to clearly tell Mr. Popoca that if 
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he pleaded guilty to the charged offense of Lewd Conduct with a Minor 
Under Sixteen, I.C. § 18-1508, he would be deported. Id. at 1483. 
Mr. Murdoch told Mr. Popoca different things about the effect that a 
conviction for the charged offense would have on his immigration status. 
On direct examination, Mr. Murdoch was questioned about what he told 
Mr. Popoca regarding how a conviction for the charged offense would 
affect Mr. Popoca's immigration status. 
Q: Okay. So that would subject him to deportation? 
A: Correct 
Q: Did you discuss that specific consequence with German? 
A: I did. I told him that. There was just one wrinkle in it. 
Q: What was that? 
A: That was my analysis, based on the research I had done, my 
knowledge of immigration law. I'd concluded that. However, the 
prosecutor in the case, Mr. Smith, had told me that the immigration 
service had contacted him, and they were under the impression that 
they could not deport Mr. Popoca for the charge that he had plead guilty 
to. 
And during my discussions with Mr. Popoca, I remember telling him - I 
gave him that information, what the immigration service was saying. 
And what I told him was that I thought the immigration service was 
wrong that they could deport him for this and most likely would. I just 
didn't understand why the immigration service took that - was taking 
that position. I thought they \vere mistaken. 
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(Tr., p. 37, Ls. 4-23.) (emphasis added). 
In his own recitation of his conversation with Mr. Popoca, Mr. Murdoch 
said that he told Mr. Popoca that he could be deported. More importantly, 
Mr. Murdoch did not tell Mr. Popoca that deportation was not a mere 
possibility or likelihood, but that his deportation would be mandated by 
law. Pursuant to federal law, Mr. Popoca is required to be ordered 
deported for having been convicted of an aggravated felony. 8 U.s.C. § 
1227(a)(2)(A)(iii); 8 U.s.C. § 1229b(a)(3). By telling Mr. Popoca both that he 
might be deported and, alternatively, that he would likely be deported, and 
suggesting to him that maybe he wouldn't be deported at all, Mr. Murdoch 
failed to clearly provide accurate advice as Padilla requires. 
On cross examination, Mr. Murdoch testified that he personally 
believed that a conviction for Lewd Conduct with a Minor Under Sixteen 
would make a non-citizen deportable. 
Q. Sure. So you told Mr. Popoca two things with regard to 
immigration. The first being, "I, Manual Murdoch, think that this is 
an absolutely deportable offense." 
A: Correct. 
Q. Okay. "But I'm also sharing with you that immigration doesn't 
believe it's a deportable offense" 
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A: Exactly. 
(Tr., p. 48, Ls. 16-23.) (emphasis added). Mr. Murdoch confirmed that the 
offense only made Mr. Popoca subject to potential deportation. He did not 
communicate deportation was presumptively automatic. 
To comply with Padilla Mr. Murdoch was required to clearly inform 
Mr. Popoca that he would be deported if he pleaded guilty to the offense 
charged. Padilla requires clear, accurate, unequivocal advice where the 
consequence is patently clear. Padilla at 1482-3. The parties do not dispute 
this point. (R., pp. 53,65-66,92.) The parties further agree that merely 
informing the non-citizen client that he may be deported is insufficient. (R., 
pp. 53,65-66,92.) Pursuant to the testimony above, Mr. Murdoch told Mr. 
Popoca that deportation was only a possibility. 
At the change of plea hearing, Mr. Murdoch went out of his way to 
explain to the trial court exactly what he told Mr. Popoca: 
MR. MURDOCH: Your Honor, if I may, there's one thing I'd like to put 
on the record. My client will most likely have some immigration 
consequences to this. And I've informed him of this, that this could 
put his permanent resident status in jeopardy, a plea to this charge, 
and he's understood that. 
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(Tr., p. II, Ls. 4-11.) (emphasis added). When confronted with the 
transcript of the change of plea hearing on cross-examination, Mr. 
Murdoch agreed that telling a person that they are deportable is 
substantively different than telling a person that they will be deported. 
Q. Okay. But that statement [ ... quoted from the change of-plea 
hearing above ... ] is not the same statement as saying, "This is an 
absolutely deportable offense. There is no relieJfor this. He will be 
deported." Would you agree with me that what I just said is different 
than what you said, is substantively different than what's in the 
transcript? 
A: Yes. 
(Tr., p. 48., Ls. 16-23.) (emphasis added). Before the trial court accepted Mr. 
Popoca's plea, Mr. Murdoch told the Court that he advised Mr. Popoca that 
deportation was a mere possibility. (Tr., p. II, Ls. 6-11.) Although Mr. 
Murdoch may have held a personal opinion that the offense was an 
aggravated felony that mandated Mr. Popoca's deportation, the record is 
replete with evidence that he also told Mr. Popoca that he might be 
deported. 
In denying the petition, the district court reiterated, as fact, that Mr. 
Murdoch testified that he told Mr. Popoca that he would be deported. (R., 
p. 94.) The decision also reiterated as fact that Mr. Murdoch told the court 
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that he told Mr. Popoca that deportation was a mere possibility. (R., p. 94.) 
The district court itself acknowledged that such advice is insufficient. (R., 
p.93.) There are no specific findings that the only advice that Mr. Murdoch 
gave Mr. Popoca about the immigration consequences is that deportation 
was a certainty. (R., pp. 88-95.) The district court's legal conclusion that 
Mr. Murdoch complied with his obligations under Padilla rested upon 
factual findings that Mr. Murdoch told Mr. Popoca that he both would be 
deported and that he may be deported. This is legal error. Therefore, the 
petition should be granted. 
III. Assuming arguendo, that the court finds that Mr. Murdoch 
unequivocally told Mr. Popoca that he would be deported as a 
result of his plea to the charged offense, the advice was nullified 
by Mr. Murdoch's direct and indirect assurances that Mr. Popoca 
might not be deported. 
Assuming that at some time Mr. Murdoch told Mr. Popoca that he 
would be deported, he also suggested he may avoid deportation due to 
ICE's purported opinion that the offense did not make Mr. Popoca 
deportable. By telling Mr. Popoca that the law required he be deported, 
and also telling him that immigration authorities thought that the offense 
did not make Mr. Popoca deportable, he effectively communicated to Mr. 
Popoca that his risk of deportation was mitigated by the circumstance of 
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ICE's opinion. In Padilla the U.s. Supreme Court clearly held that defense 
counsel is required to advise the non-citizen defendant of the correct legal 
consequence of a entering a plea. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1483 (focusing upon 
the immigration statute and the consequences required by law). Mr. 
Murdoch allowed a factual circumstance that he believed might mitigate 
the risk of deportation to Mr. Popoca to blur the clarity of otherwise correct 
legal advice. The result is unclear, unequivocal and unconstitutional 
advice. 
Even if Mr. Murdoch had provided crystal clear advice, it is of no use if 
his words and actions lead Mr. Popoca to believe that his deportation was 
not automatic, as he expressed in his verified petition. (R., p. 4-10). As 
explained by the Washington Supreme Court in State v. Sandoval, 249 P.3d 
1015, 1020 (Wash. 2011), I/[t]he required advice about immigration 
consequences would be a useless formality if, in the next breath, counsel 
could give the noncitizen defendant the impression that he or she should 
disregard what counsel just said about the risk of immigration 
consequences." 
The obligation that Mr. Murdoch take affirmative steps to 
cOlTh~unicate the clear consequence of Mr. Popoca's guilty "vas all the more 
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important given Mr. Murdoch's contrary statements at the change of plea 
hearing and his belief at the time that Mr. Popoca was low functioning.6 
(Tr., p. 11, Ls. 6-11; p. 55, Ls. 2-5.) There is no evidence that Mr. Murdoch 
took any steps to ensure that Mr. Popoca did not disregard his advice that 
that his deportation was presumptively automatic. Even if Mr. Murdoch 
reasonably believed that Mr. Popoca may not be deported because of an 
error on the part of the immigration authorities, he was still required to 
ensure that he continued to provided clear, unequivocal advice to Mr. 
Popoca. To find otherwise would gut the purpose of defense counsel's 
duty to advise as described in Padilla. 
Mr. Murdoch testified that he continued to assert ICE's erroneous 
position throughout sentencing. Mr. Murdoch's entire sentencing strategy 
depended upon ICE acting on the erroneous opinion.7 Mr. Murdoch 
6 The psychosexual that was later produced confirmed that Mr. Popoca had low 
intellectual functioning. (Tr., p. 55, Ls. 6-9.) 
7 Strategic decisions can be challenged where they are based upon (1) inadequate 
preparation, (2) ignorance of relevant law and (3) "other shortcomings" capable of 
objective evaluation. Howard v. State, 126 Idaho 231, 233 (Ct. App. 1994). Here, Mr. 
Murdoch's tactical decision was based upon the legal error that ICE controls 
prosecution of non-citizens for immigration violations, an unverified hearsay statement 
from an adverse party, and adopting a legal position he knew to be false and 
representing the same to the court. (Tr., p. 7, Ls. 24-25 - p. 8, Ls.1-6.) Petitioner 
acknowledges that the district court did not address this issue. However, because the 
State argued that Murdoch was not ineffective with regard to the sentencing strategy, 
the Petitioner addresses the issue here. 
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acknowledged that to obtain probation, Mr. Popoca would have to be 
released into the community. (Tr., p. 46, Ls. 12-15.) He further 
acknowledged that the fact that he was seeking probation could be 
interpreted by Mr. Popoca to mean that there was a chance that he could 
actually get probation. (Tr., p. 48, Ls. 4-8.) When he argued for probation 
before the trial court, Mr. Murdoch stated that Mr. Popoca's deportation 
was uncertain. (Tr., p. 46, Ls. 1-11.) 
Consistent with his standard practice, Mr. Murdoch testified that he 
would have discussed the sentencing options with Mr. Popoca. (Tr., p. 46, 
Ls.l-ll.) Any legitimate discussion about seeking probation must have 
included Mr. Murdoch's assurance to Mr. Popoca that probation was 
possible, which necessarily included the suggestion that deportation was 
not automatic. 
Finally, it cannot be said that Mr. Murdoch's belief about ICE's 
position was reasonably held. Mr. Murdoch relied upon the recollection of 
the prosecuting attorney who had spoken with" the immigration service," 
specifically ICE. (R., p. 94.) (Tr., p. 37, Ls. 24-25 - p. 38, Ls. 1-6; p. 45, Ls. 
16-23.) Mr. Murdoch never verified the information himself. Id. In 
addition, Mr. Murdoch acknowledged that even if ICE believed that Mr. 
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Popoca was not legally required to be deported because of his conviction, 
ICE is not the prosecuting body in removal proceedings. (Tr., p. 57, Ls. 7-
11.) Mr. Murdoch was therefore unclear about the role of ICE in removal 
proceedings, and the ultimate significance of ICE's legal opinion. (Tr., p. 
58, Ls. 1-25 - p. 58, Ls. 16-22; p. 59, Ls. 1-22). Compare 8 C.F.R. § 287.5 
(which outlines exercise of power by immigration officers) with 6 US.C. 
§ 252(c) (which provides that "[t]he legal advisor ... shall represent the 
bureau in all exclusion, deportation, and removal proceedings"). 
At best, Mr. Murdoch clear's and correct advice became unclear and 
incorrect when his words and actions suggested that Mr. Popoca might 
avoid deportation. As in Sandoval, the once correct advice was nullified. In 
this case, the advice was nullified by Mr. Murdoch's repeated adoption of a 
contrary position attributed to ICE, his representations to the trial court, 
and his failure to re-advise Mr. Popoca throughout the criminal 
proceedings. For these reasons, Mr. Murdoch's representation was 
deficient under Strickland. 
IV. Mr. Murdoch's deficient performance materially prejudiced Mr. 
Popoca 
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To establish prejudice, Petitioner must show a reasonable probability 
that, but for the attorney's deficient performance, the outcome of the trial 
would have been different. Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 761 (1988); 
Hughes v. State, 148 Idaho 448, 451 (Ct. App. 2009). Where, as here, the 
petitioner was convicted upon a guilty plea, the petitioner must show a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's deficiency, he would not have 
pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial, or that counsel's 
deficient performance affected the outcome of the plea process. Hill v. 
Lockhart, 106 S.Ct. 366,370 (1985); Gilpin-Grubb v. State, 138 Idaho 76, 82 
(2002); McKeeth, 140 Idaho at 851; Plant v. State, 143 Idaho 758, 762 (Ct. App. 
2006). This requires a showing that a decision not to accept a plea 
agreement and plead guilty would have been rational under the 
circumstances. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S.Ct. at 1485. The Strickland 
prejudice standard does not require proof by a preponderance of the 
evidence, but only by a lesser standard sufficient to undermine confidence 
in the outcome of the plea-bargaining process. Johnson v. Uribe, 682 F.3d 
1238 (9th Cir. 2012); Knutsen v. State, 144 Idaho 433, 443 (Ct. App. 2007). 
Mr. Murdoch's representation was deficient to the point of rendering 
tvIr. Popoca's guilty plea invalid because the plea did not represent a 
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voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action 
available to him. If Mr. Popoca had clearly known that his conviction for 
the charged offense would cause him to lose his Lawful Permanent 
Resident status in the United States and render him permanently ineligible 
to return, he would have exercised his right to a jury trial, or perhaps 
attempted to further negotiate for an immigration-neutral plea, in order to 
avoid deportation. (R., p. 8.) 
Even if at the time he changed his plea to guilty, Mr. Popoca was 
aware of the "possibility" that he might incur some risk of deportation by 
entering such a plea, this still does not show that he would not have gone 
to trial rather than plead guilty had he been properly advised that a 
conviction would make his deportation virtually certain. See Bonilla, 637 
F.3d at 984. Rejecting the guilty plea and electing to go to trial would have 
been a rational course of action under the circumstances facing Mr. Popoca 
because even if he had received the relatively minor punishment of 
prohltion that Mr. Murdoch had been fruitless in pursuing, he would still 
have faced the more severe punishment of permanent exile from the 
country he has resided in since the age of ten. (R. 4.) 
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Given the evidence available in the transcript and the record, there is 
every reason to believe that Mr. Popoca would have taken an alternative 
course of action if he had been accurately informed of the immigration 
consequences of entering a guilty plea. Mr. Popoca stated in the Petition 
that he would have exercised his right to a jury trial, or perhaps attempted 
to further negotiate for an immigration-neutral plea, in order to avoid 
deportation. (R., p. 8.) That statement is entitled to the presumption of 
truth. King v. State, 114 Idaho 442 (Ct. App. 1988). Given that Mr. Popoca 
has already been banished from the United States for the rest of his life, it is 
fair to assume that he would have taken his case to trial in order to avoid 
deportation. Such a decision would have been "rational" under the 
circumstances. These factors militate in favor of the conclusion that 
pursuing an alternative course of action - such as proceeding to trial- was 
reasonably probable under the circumstances. 
CONCLUSION 
For all of the foregoing reasons, Mr. Popoca respectfully requests that 
this Court vacate the district court's order dismissing his petition for post-
conviction relief and remand this case for further proceedings. 
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DATED this 4th day of October, 20138. 
<../ 
Maria E. Andrade 
Attorney for Petitioner 
8 On October 3,2013, Andrade Legal was orally granted a 24-hour extension to file this brie£ 
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